Recent empirical evidence links migrant remittances and return migration, and stresses the impact of uncertainty on migrant decisions. Theoretical analyses of the motives for remittances generally neglect these features, and do not include alternative strategies such as savings, which potentially have very di¤erent implications for both migrants and origin countries. This paper presents a model of endogenous remittances, savings and return decisions under uncertainty. This setting, which applies to long-term international migration, addresses the following questions. Which migrant characteristics a¤ect their remittance-saving portfolio decisions? How do these decisions interact with migration success and return plans? In our framework, migrants make remittance and saving decisions at an early stage of migration, when migration success and return options are uncertain. Over time, information about professional prospects is acquired, and conditionally on past decisions, migrants adjust their return plans. We show that migrants anticipating a large wage in the host country, or a relatively low risk of migration failure are less likely to remit and to return, and more likely to save. These results are in line with recent empirical evidence, such as the large share of non-remitting migrants, the fact that migrants facing higher risks are more likely to remit, and the potentially poor economic performance of returnees. Finally, we provide a rationale for the support by relatives in the sending country of low-skill, illegal migration.
1 3 strongly related in our model to the positive e¤ect of past remittances on the likelihood of return. Dustmann et al. (2010) prove the existence of this "feedback e¤ect" in their thorough analysis of the impact of return plans on remittances. They show that failing to take it into account leads to biased estimates of that impact.
Finally, the empirical literature provides mixed evidence on the economic success of return migrants. Our model provides rationales for this phenomenon, and may explain cases of negative selection of return migrants.
For instance, Coulon & Piracha (2005) and Campos-Vazquez (2012) show that the average counterfactual wages of return migrants had they never migrated are lower than the average wages of stayers, despite the existence of a migration premium derived from the human capital accumulated in the host country. In our model, there is …rst a potential negative selection at the …rst stage of migration since, as explained above, migrants who have relatively low and risky bene…ts from migration are the most likely to remit, and therefore are likely to receive support. Second, because of transaction costs, the more migrants remit, the more they are ready to concede low wages in the origin country. Furthermore, the low prospect, high risk migrants are the most likely to remit and are therefore the most susceptible to return and earn low wages.
In line with the explained empirical evidence, this model allows us to identify two distinct types of investment motives for remittances. 8 First, when the expected returns to remittances are larger than the returns to savings, we say that remittances are sent with a "pure investment motive". Second, when the migrant's risk structure across locations is such that remittances reduce the total variance of future consumption, remittances may be sent with a "precautionary investment motive". Illegal migrants are particularly subject to this second motive.
The paper is organized as follows. A review of the recent literature is provided in Section 2. The general setting is introduced in Section 3. The case of risk neutral migrants is presented in Section 4, while the case of risk averse migrants is analyzed in section 5. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
Review of the literature
This paper links three …elds of the migration literature: the study of (i) the motives for remittances, (ii) return migration plans, and (iii) the role of uncertainty at the early stages of migration.
First, the literature analyzing the motives for remittances has been initiated by Lucas & Stark (1985) .
Recent surveys of this question are provided by Rapoport & Docquier (2006 ), Carling (2008 ) and Stark (2009 . Remittances are generally motivated by altruism towards the left behind and/or by the existence of an implicit contract between the migrant and the recipient. This implicit contract can take various forms.
Remittances may be part of a mutual insurance arrangement. Indeed, migration allows families to diversify their income sources (Stark & Levhari (1982) ) and remittances can be considered as insurance transfers to the family left behind (de la Briere et al. (2002) ; Gubert (2002) ; Choi & Yang (2007) ). Remittances may also be seen as the repayment by the migrant of an implicit loan which made the initial migration possible (Poirine (1997) ). As previously mentioned, remittances also foster investments in education (Edwards & prospects and provide them with informal insurance. The counterpart of these networks is that they exert a pressure to remit, which provides an additional reason why origin countries support risky migration. 8 In order to keep the exposition as simple as possible, the altruism motive is not presented in this model. The inclusion of this motive, even though it would clearly provide an additional incentive to remit, would not qualitatively a¤ect our main results, which describe the e¤ects of remittances on return plans and on the expectation and the variance of the migrant's consumption.
Furthermore, as discussed in the conclusion, the altruism motive is di¢ cult to distinguish from a motive of investment in social capital in the origin country. (Adams (1998)) and innovative production technologies (Mendola (2008) ), but also in …nancial development (Aggarwal et al. (2011) ), housing (Osili (2004) ; Adams Jr. & Cuecuecha (2010) ) and social capital (Maggard (2004) ; Gallego & Mendola (2009) ).
Whether altruism is involved or not in the migrant's decision making process, these investments generally bene…t both remittance recipients and migrants themselves, either in terms of physical or social capital.
For instance, remittances maintain membership rights in home communities (Osili (2007) ) and generate the gratitude from recipients (Stark & Falk (1998) ). Remittances may also be sent to migrants'extended family and friends in order to ensure the provision of services, such as the maintenance of migrants'patrimony, cattle and crops (Cox (1987) ). Finally, migrants may invest in their future inheritance by sending money to their parents and improve their position against their siblings (the so-called strategic bequest motive, observed by Hoddinott (1994), Schrieder & Knerr (2000) and de la Briere et al. (2002) ).
Second, return migration is an important phenomenon. For instance, about 40% of migrants leave the host country after 5 to 7 years of migration (Bijwaard (2010) for the Netherlands, Dustmann & Weiss (2007) for the UK). Return migration has …rst been explained by location-speci…c preferences (Hill (1987) ; Djajic & Milbourne (1988) ). More recent contributions relate return migration to long term strategies (Borjas & Bratsberg (1996) ), motivated either by "lifecycle" or "target earnings" considerations. Migrants caring about lifecycle consumption determine the length of their stay abroad by trading o¤ higher (utility) costs of staying abroad, including di¤erences in purchasing powers, for higher earnings in the host country (Djajic & Milbourne (1988) ; Stark et al. (1997) ; Dustmann (1997) ; Dustmann (2003) ). An increase in wages may lead "lifecycle migrants" to stay longer in the host country. In contrast, migrants wishing to invest in their country of origin need to accumulate su¢ cient "target earnings" before returning (Mesnard (2004 ), Djajic (2010 ). These savings often translate into entrepreneurial activities, which require liquidities and are more pro…table if migrants acquired speci…c skills and human capital in the host country (Dustmann & Kirchkamp (2002) , Dustmann et al. (2011) ). Compared to lifecycle consumption, "target earnings"considerations provide opposite predictions: higher wages in the host country allow migrants to reach the required level of savings faster, allowing them to shorten their stay in the host country. Yang (2006) uses exchange rate shocks to empirically test both theories and …nds a larger support for the lifecycle theory.
As regards remittances, recent empirical evidence highlights the positive link between return intentions and remittances (Dustmann et al. (2010) ; Sinning (2011) ; Piracha & Randazzo (2011) ) and between return intentions and asset holdings by migrants in the origin country (Dustmann & Mestres (2011) ). Yet to the best of our knowledge, our model is the …rst to take into account this relation, and in particular the feedback e¤ect of remittances on return plans (Dustmann et al. (2010) ).
Third, with regard to uncertainty, most theories analyzing migration duration assume that duration is decided at the beginning of the migration process, under perfect foresight. There is however strong evidence that migrants form erroneous expectations about available opportunities in the host country (Borjas & Bratsberg (1996) ) and about the length of their stay, for instance in case of illegal migration and/or of poor economic performance (Tunali (2000) Piracha & Zhu (2012) ). Yet, few theoretical works incorporate uncertainty. Galor & Stark (1991) assume that return itself is random and exogenous and show that the return probability induces migrants to save more than native-born individuals. Dustmann (1997) presents a model of savings and optimal duration under uncertainty. However, these decisions are jointly made ex ante.
Our paper contributes to the three mentioned …elds in the following ways. Among the motives for remittances, we focus on the investment motive in various forms, including social capital (membership rights, gratitude, status). Interestingly, a self-interested behavior involving investments of this kind mimics the predictions of the altruism motive (Stark & Falk (1998) ), since both altruistic and self-interested migrants bene…t more from helping poorer recipients. Regarding the comparison between lifecycle and target earnings theories of return migration, our framework is more in line with lifecycle considerations, since high wages in the host country lower the likelihood of return migration. It is also worth noting that unlike many theoretical analyses previously cited, our model does not require di¤erences in purchasing power or in preferences for consumption between host and home countries in order to motivate return migration. Instead, return migration is motivated here by the fact that for some migrants, remittances may have a higher return than savings, or may decrease future risks. Because of the feedback e¤ect, remittances increase the willingness to return. In other words, return migration in our framework is driven by the comparison between savings and remittances and by the feedback e¤ect. Finally, while the few studies which account for uncertainty preclude any revision of return migration plans when information about the migration outcome is revealed, our setting allows migrants to choose their …nal location after the revelation of information. This feature is one of the main driving forces of our results.
The model
Let us consider a migrant who lives for two periods, noted t 2 f1; 2g. At the beginning of period 1, the migrant has just arrived in the host country h and earns a certain initial wage w 1 0, but faces uncertainty about long term wage prospects, i.e. wages that could be obtained by settling in the host country, or by returning to the origin country o after a migration experience. Formally, at the beginning of period 1, the migrant only knows the joint density function of period-2 wages in the origin and host countries, noted k (w o ; w h ). Also, at this period, the migrant makes decisions on savings s and remittances r. Consumption in period 1 is written:
Savings, which are placed on a bank account in the host country, produce s at the beginning of period 2.
Remittances are invested in the country of origin in some form of (physical, …nancial, social) capital. 9 This investment produces a return R l (r) for the migrant in period 2, which depends on the migrant's location 9 While remittances need not always have an explicit investment purpose, they generally bene…t the migrant by maintaining his/her membership rights, and by improving his/her social status in the community. In this case, they can therefore also be considered as a form of investment.
6 decision l 2 fh; og. 10 R l (r) is location-speci…c because if migrants choose to stay in the host country, migrants only partially bene…t from investments made in the country of origin. The loss incurred in case of permanent migration is either due to transaction costs borne to liquidate the asset (e.g. a house, a small business,...), or simply because some speci…c types of assets, like social capital, are immobile, illiquid and therefore sunk. As a result, R o (r) R h (r). Also, let us de…ne D R (r) R o (r) R h (r) as the di¤erence in returns to remittances between temporary and permanent migration, or transaction costs, which increase with the value of the investment: D 0 R (r) > 0.
11
At the end of period 1, the migrant observes w o and w h . Based on this information, the migrant decides at the beginning of period 2 whether to stay permanently in the host country, or to return to the country of origin. In order to do so, the migrant compares consumption levels in both locations. Period-2 consumption levels if the migrant opts for the origin / host countries are respectively:
Note that contrary to remittances and wages, savings are perfectly mobile, since they can be withdrawn and spent in any location.
Summing up, this setting highlights the trade-o¤ between higher expected wages in the host country and higher returns to remittances in the origin country in a context of uncertainty. In the …rst period, the migrant decides on savings and remittances (s; r). In the second period, wages in both locations (w o , w h ) are observed by the migrant, who chooses a location l 2 fh; og. Solving backwards, we start by analyzing the second period's problem, namely the location choice, and derive its consequences on the (ex ante) likelihood of return migration in period 1 and on saving and remittance decisions.
Optimal location choice
The migrant chooses the location in which the consumption level is the highest, so that ex-post, period-2 consumption c 2 = max fc o ; c h g. In this simple setting, this choice boils down to comparing the di¤erence in returns to remittances between origin and host countries, Lemma 1 In period 2, the migrant returns to the origin country if D w < D R .
The condition for return migration simply comes from the comparison between c o and c h :
1 0 We do not impose speci…c assumptions on the shape of R l (r) and keep it general. It is likely however that this shape is a¤ected by the relationship between the sender and the recipient of remittances, and we discuss this point in Section 4.2. 1 1 This is obvious in the case of investments in social capital where
For other types of investments, this only implies that the larger the investment, the larger the cost to liquidate the asset, for instance in the case of proportional costs. A more complex framework involving a recipient in an agency relationship also leads to D 0 R (r) > 0 (not presented here but available upon request).
1 2 This basic version, which neglects di¤erences in purchasing powers and country preferences, already allows us to reproduce many stylized facts about remittances and return migration plans. The impact of such di¤erences will be discussed further.
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Having determined the optimal location condition, we can now start the analysis of the migrant's problem in period 1. In this period, wages, and consequently the wage gap D w , are treated as random variables.
Return migration is therefore uncertain, and depends on the distribution of Lemma 2 In period 1, the probability of return migration, Pr (D w < D R ) = F (D R ), increases with remittances:
This Lemma provides microfoundations of the "feedback e¤ect" of remittances on return plans (Dustmann & Mestres (2009)). 13 In the next two sections, we will solve the migrant's problem in period 1, i.e. de…ning optimal remittances and savings under uncertainty, anticipating optimal location decisions in period 2. Since remittances have di¤erent returns depending on the location choice, but also a¤ect the probability of return migration, they have complex e¤ects on the distribution of consumption patterns in period 2. These e¤ects pertain to expected consumption on the one hand, and risk on the other hand. For the sake of expositional simplicity, we will separate the cases of risk neutrality and risk aversion in two distinct sections. In order to do so, recall …rst that the migrant's preferences have two relevant aspects, namely risk aversion and consumption smoothing over time, which standard expected utility does not allow to disentangle. 14 In contrast, the more general non-expected utility theory developed by Selden (1978) and Kreps & Porteus (1978) separates risk aversion and consumption smoothing. 15 Following this approach, the migrant's utility is noted
where both u ( ) and g ( ) are increasing, concave functions. g 1 E (g (c 2 )) =c 2 is the certainty equivalent functional of period-2 consumption, with
where with probability F (D R ) the migrant returns to the country of origin and enjoys E(g (c o ) jD w D R ), where c o depends on the realization of w o . With probability (1 F (D R )), the migrant stays in the host country and enjoys E(g (c h ) jD w > D R ). While the concavity of u( ) captures the migrant's taste for consumption smoothing, the concavity of g( ) captures the degree of risk aversion. Section 4 and 5 are based on two particular cases of Kreps-Porteus preferences. Section 4 covers the case of risk-neutral migrants having a taste for consumption smoothing, which corresponds to a linear g( ) function and a concave u ( ) function. This case allows us to introduce the "pure investment motive" for remittances, which appears when the expected return to remittances dominates that of savings. In Section 5, we introduce risk aversion by posing that u ( ) and g ( ) are identical. This second case, which corresponds to expected utility, puts forward the "precautionary motive" for remittances: depending on the distribution of wage risks across locations, remittances may decrease the variance of future consumption.
1 3 See the introductory section. 1 4 For example, assuming risk neutrality under standard expected utility would impose the utility function to be linear. In this case, the migrant has no taste for consumption smoothing either, so that at equilibrium, consumption is always at a corner in one of the two periods. 1 5 The models of Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Selden (1978) are equivalent but we use the formulation of Kreps and Porteus which is more intuitive. See Chapter 20 of Gollier (2004) for an introduction to non-expected utility.
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Following equation (4) and using a linear g( ) function, the risk-neutral migrant's utility is:
where c 1 is de…ned in (1) and c 2 is equal to c o (2) if D w < D R , and is equal to c h (3) otherwise. Since D w is by de…nition equal to w h w o , it belongs to the same data generating process. Therefore, for a given pair (w o ; w h ) and its corresponding wage gap D w , the following joint densities have the same values:
, where m (w o ; D w ) and n (w h ; D w ) are joint densities of wages with
16 Using these notations, we can write the expectation of period-2 consumption by distinguishing the two …nal possible locations:
Let us …rst analyze the properties of the remittance technology in the way it a¤ects the expectation of future consumption. Based on these properties, we will study in a second subsection the optimal remittances decision of risk-neutral migrants.
The impact of remittances on expected consumption
In this subsection, we will analyze the impact of remittances on (i) the expected consumption in each location, and (ii) the total expectation of consumption, taking into account optimal location decisions.
The …rst analysis will provide interesting results about the economic success of return migrants and of permanent migrants. In order to study the expected consumption in each location conditional, let us rewrite (6) as:
where conditional expectations of consumption in case of return and permanent migration are respectively:
and conditional expectations of wages are:
This decomposition allows us to assess the impact of remittances on the expected consumption in each location separately, taking into account the endogeneity of the location decision. Such an exercise brings two 1 6 Note that by de…nition,
9 interesting …ndings. First, it allows us to provide an explanation to the poor performance of some return migrants. 17 Second, it shows that remittances, although they are more productive in case of return migration, increase the conditional expectation of consumption of migrants settling in the host country.
Proposition 1 Conditionally on optimal location decisions in period 2, 1. remittances decrease the expected wage E(w o jD w D R ), but have an ambiguous impact on the expected consumption in the country of origin:
where
2. remittances have a positive impact on the expected wage and consumption in the host country:
where R 0 h (r) > 0 and
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Remittances have an ambiguous impact on E(c o jD w D R ) because, ceteris paribus, migrants who remit more are ready to concede lower wages in the origin country. Indeed, as r increases, so does D R , so that the condition to return (D w D R ) is easier to satisfy. In other words, return migration is compatible with higher values of D w , that is, lower (higher) values of w o (w h ). This result provides a rationale for poor economic outcomes of return migrants: the more migrants remit, the more likely they will return, and the lower the wages they are ready to accept in case of return. Conversely, remittances have a positive impact on E(w h jD w > D R ): migrants who remit are less likely to stay, which implies that they will do so only for su¢ ciently large wages in the host country.
Having analyzed the impact of remittances by location, let us now analyze their global impact on
To this end, let us rewrite (6) as:
where: and E [R] separately. The next Lemma shows that migrants who decide to remit anticipate lower expected wages, but higher expected bene…ts from remittances.
Lemma 3 Remittances have a negative impact on E [w] and a positive impact on E [R]:
The …rst part of the lemma, which states that remittances have a negative impact on expected wages, is Proposition 2 The total expectation of future consumption is increasing, and potentially convex in remittances.
Combining the two parts of Lemma 3 leads directly to Proposition 2. This proposition shows …rst that remittances a¤ect E [c 2 ] through an increase in returns to remittances, but also a decrease in the expected wage, since remittances increase the likelihood of migrating back to the country of origin, where wages are on average lower. However, the net marginal e¤ect of remittances on expected consumption is always positive, and corresponds to the expected marginal return to remittances, E [R 0 (r)]. The following …gure illustrates these e¤ects. In this …gure, when remittances are close to zero, the probability of return migration is zero,
As remittances increase, the likelihood of return migration becomes strictly positive, and E [R (r)] increases, as it becomes a convex combination of R h (r) and R o (r).
Also, E [w] decreases, as it depends on the distribution of both w h and w o . As stated in the previous proposition, the sum of these two e¤ects is always positive (the blue curve is always increasing in r). As remittances increase further, they become so large that the probability of returning to the origin country becomes equal to 1. In that case, E [R (r)] = R o (r), and
Further increases in remittances no longer a¤ect expected wages, while returns to remittances are perceived with certainty in the country of origin. Secondly, the proposition shows that expected consumption is not only increasing, but may also be convex in r. This potential convexity comes from the …rst term in the right hand side of (12), which is positive and is due to the feedback e¤ect of remittances. Indeed, even if R o (r) and R h (r) are not convex, expected consumption may be more and more increasing in remittances because the more the migrant remits, the higher the probability of returning to the origin country, where the bene…ts of remittances are the highest. In other words, as the migrant remits, E [R (r)] puts more weight on R o (r), and less on R h (r). In the following …gure, we present a case where R o (r) and R h (r) are both linear, so that, following the previous reasoning, returns to remittances are always convex:
0. This …gure illustrates that as long This possible variety in the "technology" of returns to remittances gives rise to the following questions:
(i) which migrant characteristics are likely to lead to high/low or concave/convex returns to remittances, and
(ii) how does this a¤ect the migrant's optimal remittances behavior? We address the …rst question in the next subsection, looking at the impact of migrants'beliefs about migration success in terms of wages and at recipients'characteristics in the country of origin and their use of remittances.
How migrant characteristics a¤ect the impact of r on E [c 2 ]
In this subsection, we discuss the impact of migrants'and recipients'characteristics on the shape of returns to remittances, both through First, we show that the higher migrants'anticipations about migration success in terms of wages, the lower their expected marginal returns to remittances. In order to show this, let us consider that some migrants have higher wage prospects from migration than others following the concept of …rst order stochastic dominance.
A migrant with high (low) wage prospects faces a cumulative distribution of the wage gap between host and origin countries noted
The distribution of the wage gap for migrants with high prospects …rst-order stochastically dominates that of migrant with low wage prospects:
In other words, for any given D w , the higher the migrant's wage prospects, the lower F (D w ). Note that …rst order stochastic dominance implies that migrants with higher prospects have a higher expected wage
Lemma 4 For all r, the higher the migrant's wage prospects, the lower
Proof. One can rewrite
, which clearly increases with F (D R (r)). For a given level of D R , a migrant with higher migration prospects faces a lower expected marginal return to remittances. See Appendix 2 for a graphical illustration.
Let us now discuss how recipient characteristics a¤ect
@r 2 . We have seen that
is the sum of
. While the …rst is always positive, the second term may also be positive, depending on the way recipients in the origin country use remittances. Indeed, E [R 00 (r)] is more likely to be positive in poor receiving households than in rich ones. Intuitively, poor families are likely to …rst allocate remittances to their basic needs. The more the migrant remits, the higher recipients'capacity to switch to more productive investments, which also bene…ts the migrant. Marginal returns to remittances are therefore negligible for low levels of remittances, and become attractive as recipient households have improved their living conditions. As a result, migrants originating from poor households are more likely to face convex returns to remittances. This reasoning has been illustrated by Adams (1998), which shows that households with a migrant member have a higher marginal propensity to invest.
In the next section, we analyze migrants' optimal saving and remittance decisions, taking into account the potential heterogeneity in the remittance technology across migrants.
Optimal savings and remittances under risk neutrality
The risk-neutral migrant's objective is:
M ax
where c 1 and E [c 2 ] are de…ned in (1) and (8), and both r and s need to satisfy non-negativity constraints.
While remittances can obviously not be negative, borrowing is precluded by the migrant's lack of credibility to repay a loan in case of return migration. As mentioned in Proposition 2, returns to remittances may either be concave, or convex. Let us analyze these two cases separately.
Proposition 3 Under risk neutrality, if R o (r) and R h (r) are su¢ ciently concave, then
0, and three types of remittance-saving portfolios are possible: (0; s ), (r ; s ) and (r ; 0), where: 
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If both …rst order conditions are satis…ed with equality, that is, if there is an interior solution in both r and s, we obtain the following arbitrage condition:
The marginal returns to both activities must equalize at this double interior solution. However, depending on the migrant's wage prospects, one of these two …rst order conditions may not hold with equality, leading to a corner solution in either r or s. Following Lemma 4, if prospects are so high that E [R 0 (0)] < , marginal returns to remittances are too low for the migrant to send remittances ; instead he/she will focus on savings.
In contrast, if prospects are low, the optimal level of remittances may still have a marginal return which dominates that of savings: E [R 0 (r )] > . In this case, the migrant has no incentives to save and will only remit. These three cases are illustrated in Figure 3 .
It must be noted that the solutions described here are valid if and only if under "high" migration prospects: (0; s ) with U (0; s ) > U (r ; 0) and s such that
under "low" migration prospects: (r ; 0) with U (r ; 0) > U (0; s ), and r such that
Proof. See Appendix 3.
The main insight of this case is that the optimal remittance/saving portfolio of the migrant is never diversi…ed when returns to remittances are convex. Which of the two assets is chosen depends again on return prospects. If prospects are high (low), marginal returns to remittances are low and the migrant saves (remits). Let us now analyze the risk implications of remittances.
Risk averse migrants and the precautionary investment motive
In this section, we generalize migrants'preferences by introducing risk aversion, while maintaining the rest of the model unchanged. As previously mentioned, the migrant's utility function in this section is based on expected utility:
where c 1 is de…ned in (1) and c 2 is equal to c o if D R > D w , and is equal to c h otherwise, where c o and c h are de…ned respectively in (2) and (3). In this analysis, we will make use of the standard concepts of certainty equivalent and Arrow-Pratt approximation of the risk premium. Letc 2 denote the certainty equivalent of c 2 , that is, u (c 2 ) = Eu (c 2 ). This certainty equivalent can be approximated bỹ
where is the migrant's degree of absolute risk aversion. Based on this formula, and since we already studied the e¤ect of remittances on E (c 2 ), we will focus in this section on the variance of c 2 . One can show, as an application of the law of total variance, that V ar(c 2 ) takes the following form:
and
Let us describe intuitively the two terms composing the variance of c 2 . The …rst term, E [V ar (c 2 jD w )], which is decomposed in (19), represents the average variance over the two locations. More precisely, it is the weighted sum of consumption variances by location, where weights are the probabilities of choosing these respective locations. The second term, V ar [E (c 2 jD w )], which is decomposed in (20), represents the consumption variance which is due to di¤erences in expected consumption across locations. This second term can be interpreted as the risk imposed by the uncertainty about the future location itself.
In the next subsection, we assess the impact of remittances on the aggregate risk faced by the migrant.
The impact of remittances on consumption variance
In this section, we will provide a rationale, based on risk considerations, to the fact that migrants facing relatively more risks in the host country, such as illegal migrants, are more likely to remit than others.
Indeed, the initial distribution of uncertainty is an important determinant of the migrant's ability to use remittances as a precautionary investment. More precisely, we show that if the wage uncertainty is mostly located in the host country labor market, remittances have the property of reducing future consumption variance. This argument also provides a rationale for the fact that in developing countries, families provide support for illegal/risky migration. Indeed, it is in the own interest of migrants facing high risk in the host country to send remittances, so that families are likely to receive a return on investment independently of pressure mechanisms, such as migrant networks. This section also allows us to show that the location choice (temporary versus permanent migration) is per se a risk-coping mechanism, used ex post. Remittances, sent ex ante, improve the e¤ectiveness of this ex-post risk-coping device.
The impact of remittances on aggregate risk is highlighted in the following Lemma. The economic intuition follows in the subsequent propositions.
Lemma 5 The derivative of the total consumption variance is determined by
Proof. See Appendix 4.
Lemma 5 describes the e¤ect of remittances on the variance of the migrant's future consumption. The sign of this e¤ect depends on two terms. First, remittances are likely to decrease V ar(c 2 ) if the expected consumption is lower in the origin country than in the host country (E(c o jD
Note that these expectations are conditional on the wage gap, and that the distribution of wages across the two locations is in fact a crucial determinant of the sign of this …rst term. Second, remittances are likely to decrease V ar(c 2 ) if, at the margin where the migrant is indi¤erent between staying and returning (i.e.
for D w = D R ), the variance of wages in the origin country is lower than the variance of wages in the host country.
In order to provide more insights from this general formula and to highlight the role played by the distribution of wage risks across locations, we need to add more structure on the distribution of wages. h . We assume without loss of generality that wages are independently distributed across locations, so that cov (w o ; w h ) = 0.
19 The reason why we assume a bivariate normal distribution is that this distribution has appealing properties allowing analytical solutions and providing intuitive results. One implication of normality is that the migrant's income variance
. This is intuitive since, at this point, uncertainty related to the location itself vanishes, given that ex ante the consumption levels are equal in both locations. It has to be noted, however, that if this level is optimal from an insurance perspective (precautionary motive), remittances are also potentially sent to increase the migrant's expected income (pure investment motive).
This combination of motives is explored in the section devoted to the migrant's optimization problem.
How migrant characteristics a¤ect the impact of r on V ar (c 2 )
As in the previous section, let us consider how some migrant characteristic may a¤ect the remittance technology, in term of consumption variance this time. Let us de…ne the relative variance of wages in the host country as
Clearly, migrants di¤er in terms of h . For instance, illegal migrants are more likely to face risk in the host country, in which case h is close to one. On the other hand, well established and integrated migrants should face very little risk in the host country, while uncertainty in case of return is higher.
Proposition 5 Remittances are risk-reducing if the relative host-country wage variance h is su¢ ciently large:
where the threshold e h depends on D R (r):
Proof. See Appendix 5.
Proposition 5 indicates that remittances decrease the aggregate income risk faced by the migrant if her initial risk is mainly located in the host country (large h ). Intuitively, increasing remittances makes return migration more likely, which reduces the exposition to the relatively large risk in the host country. An important implication of Proposition 5 is that e h is itself a function of the level of remittances. The next proposition states that the impact of remittances on risk is non-monotonic.
Proposition 6 e h is increasing in r. Therefore, V ar(c 2 ) is potentially non-monotonic in r, being decreasing for low r, and increasing for large r.
Proof. See Appendix 6.
This proposition states that low levels of remittances may decrease aggregate risk, as in this case e h is low and is likely to be smaller than h . Large levels of remittances may on the other hand be risk-increasing, as e h is then high and will eventually be larger than h .
It must be noted at this stage that the impact of remittances on aggregate risk is largely driven by the fact that our framework accounts for the location choice. More precisely, it can be argued that in this setting, the genuine self insurance device is the migrant's ability to choose her location after information about wages is revealed. Indeed, for any initial geographical distribution of risks, the migrant is protected against low wages by the ability to select the best outcome among both locations. In other words, the migrant is capable of mitigating a negative shock in one location by moving to the other location. Moreover, as we show in the following example, this instrument is most powerful if risk is evenly distributed among locations. Example 1 provides the intuition behind propositions 5 and 6, namely that remittances are risk-reducing if risk is mainly located in the host economy and that transferring too much risk towards the origin country might, at the end, increase the aggregate risk faced by the migrant. In order to illustrate these points, we use a simpli…ed framework where the only decision variable is location.
Example 1 Suppose an agent can choose between two locations fa; bg, where wages are random and take the following form:
where x F (x) and E (x) = 0. Let ! M ax fw a ; w b g de…ne the wage the agent will obtain in period two after selection of the optimal location. Two results emerge from this example.
1. The capacity to choose the best location always improves the expected consumption: the expected consumption conditional on optimal location, E (!), is larger than the unconditional expected consumption w.
2. The consumption variance conditional on optimal location, V ar (!) is minimized when the initial income risk is identical in both locations, i.e. for h = 1=2.
Proof. See Appendix 7.
As this simpli…ed example illustrates, on the one hand, the location choice allows the migrant to increase expected consumption. On the other hand, it shows that aggregate risk depends on the initial risk composition. More precisely, the more the distribution of wage risks across locations is even ex ante, the lower the variance of consumption conditional on optimal location. If risk is mainly located in the host economy, remittances can be used to improve the balance of risks across locations, so that aggregate risk is reduced.
This mechanism provides an explanation to the empirical evidence according to which migrants facing higher risks in the host country are more likely to remit (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo (2006) , Dustmann et al. (2010) ).
On the contrary, as stated in Proposition 6, remittances may increase aggregate risk if the origin country is relatively riskier.
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Optimal savings and remittances under risk aversion
The migrant maximizes expected utility with respect to savings and remittances. The …rst order conditions are given by
wherec 2 is de…ned in equation (18), so that under constant absolute risk aversion,
, as described in Proposition 2, and where the impact on the variance is given by equation (21). We are now able to formally take into account both precautionary and pure investment motives. Under risk neutrality, we have shown that returns to remittances are likely to be convex, as discussed after equation (12). In the risk averse case, we need to also take into account the e¤ect of remittances on consumption variance in order to de…ne the concavity or convexity of total returns to remittances. Note that another source of migrant heterogeneity, namely risk aversion , ampli…es this result: the larger , the larger the impact of r on V ar (c 2 ).
De…nition 1 Under risk aversion, total returns to remittances are concave if
Whether returns to remittances are convex or concave matters for the optimal migrant portfolio. Indeed, as in the section with risk neutrality, we know that the migrant's objective may admit an interior maximum in both s and r only if total returns to remittances are concave. Although convex total returns to remittances are still possible for risk averse migrants, this possibility is less likely than in the case of risk neutral migrants.
The fact that concavity is the more relevant case under risk aversion is due to the impact of remittances on the variance of consumption. By Proposition 6, we know that
> 0. This e¤ect, whose magnitude increases with the degree of absolute risk aversion , increases the likelihood of concave returns to remittances. As a result, it is likely that risk averse migrants choose strictly positive levels of both savings and remittances. However, one should keep in mind that, even if returns to remittances are concave, the non-negativity constraint on savings may, under some conditions, be binding. As in Proposition 3, this will be the case if the return to savings is low compared to the returns to remittances, which, in the risk averse case, combine potential bene…ts in terms of both expectation and variance of consumption. For instance, because remittances are risk-reducing for illegal migrants, these migrants are more likely to have no savings, other things being equal.
If
@ 2 e c2 @r 2 0, then depending on migration prospects and host-country relative risk h , three types of remittance-saving portfolios are possible:
"high" and "safe" migration prospects (large E 
@ 2 e c2 @r 2 > 0, then the optimal remittance/saving portfolio is never diversi…ed:
"high" and "safe" migration prospects: (0; s ) with U (0; s ) > U (r ; 0) and s such that
"low" and "risky" migration prospects: (r ; 0) with U (r ; 0) > U (0; s ) and r such that
The last section provides a taxonomy of the motives for remittances, based on the analysis conducted above.
5.4 Remittances as pure and/or precautionary investment? 
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This equation is represented in Figure 5 by the straight line with positive slope 2 . All points below this line are such that @c2 @r < , in which cases it is not in the migrant's interest to remit. For this reason, r is at a corner in the grey area in the lower right corner of the graph.
In the upper left part of the …gure, remittances are attractive because @c2 @r . If @E(c2) @r < , the investment motive is irrelevant since savings provide a better return. However, the fact that @c2 @r > is due to the fact that remittances are risk-reducing at the margin. Therefore, remittances are spent on a precautionary motive in this case, which is represented by the yellow triangle. The opposite case is captured by the orange triangle, in which only the investment motive is relevant, since @E(c2) @r > whereas remittances increase risk:
@V ar(c2) @r > 0. Finally, the white square represents the area where both motives are met since remittances have a higher average return than savings and decrease the aggregate risk.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we present a theory of migrants'decisions on their remittance-saving portfolio under uncertainty about migration success and endogenous return migration. Stylized facts show that migrants have poor information about their professional prospects at the time of arrival in the host country. In our model, beliefs about such prospects a¤ect migrants' remittance and saving decisions at the early stage of migration, and will in turn shape the likelihood of return migration in the future. The model provides insights about the role played by such migrant characteristics on portfolio decisions. Two key results are obtained.
First, the higher the migration prospects (i.e. expected wage gain from migration), the lower the incentive to remit and the higher the incentive to save. This result stems from the fact that ceteris paribus, migrants with high migration prospects are less likely to return to their origin country. As a result, migrants anticipate that they will only partly enjoy the bene…ts of the investments …nanced by their remittances in the country of origin (housing, businesses, social capital,...). Therefore, they tend to remit less and to favor savings ex ante.
Second, migrants who face a relatively large wage risk in the host country are more likely to remit: remitting allows them to balance future risks across locations as it increases the likelihood of return migration.
Combining these prospect and risk characteristics, the model predicts that low-skill, illegal migrants are likely to remit, whereas highly-educated and documented migrants are less likely to remit. Intermediate remitters are for instance legal migrants with low levels of education, and student migrants, whose returns from migration are potentially high but risky.
These results provide insights to explain the massive ‡ows of low-skill, illegal migrants towards more developed countries. Indeed, it is in the own interest of such migrants to send remittances, independently of pressure mechanisms, such as migrant networks, or altruistic behavior. Therefore, relatives of these migrants anticipate that they are likely to receive remittances if they invest in them by fostering migration, even if their supervision mechanisms are limited.
The model also reproduces other stylized facts. For instance, the diversi…cation of migrants' portfolios depends on the remittance technology, and more precisely on whether returns to remittances are concave or convex. When remittances have convex returns, migrants either save or remit, but do not invest in both assets. This result contributes to explanation of the large share of non-remitting migrants. Also, the model can explain potential cases of negative selection of return migrants through two e¤ects. First, we have seen that family support for migration may not be targeted towards the brightest candidates, since migrants with low and risky wage prospects are more likely to remit. Second, remitting migrants are more likely to return 22 in order to enjoy the bene…ts of their remittances, which leads them to accept potentially lower wages than if they had not remitted.
Finally, let us discuss some assumptions of the model.
First, the migrant is assumed purely sel…sh. It must …rst be noted that, as shown by Stark & Falk (1998) , migrants'remitting behavior towards poor recipients may be mistakenly interpreted as altruism, since they may simply be due to the migrant's taste for gratitude from recipients. The impact per monetary unit on gratitude is indeed, ceteris paribus, greater for poor recipients than rich ones. Interestingly, this approach is in line with the investment motive we analyze in this paper. Still, let us brie ‡y discuss the impact of altruism in our model. It must be highlighted that most of our results would not be a¤ected by the introduction of altruism. Indeed, our conclusions on the technological e¤ects of remittances on the expectation and variance of future consumption are independent of the migrant's preferences. Naturally, this does not mean that altruism towards the recipient would not a¤ect the migrant's saving and remitting decisions. Clearly, altruism provides an additional motive to remit, favoring remittances over savings. However, introducing altruism implies the inclusion of the recipient's utility in the migrant's utility function. Because the recipient's utility is concave in remittances, altruism would therefore reduce the degree of convexity of the returns to remittances. Because of this second e¤ect, an interior solution in both remittances and savings is more likely.
Second, the paper does not take into account subjective preferences for one country nor the di¤erence in purchasing powers between the host and the origin countries. On the one hand, country-speci…c preferences could easily be introduced in the model. Migrants having a strong preference for living in the country of origin would adopt similar strategies as migrants with low migration prospects, i.e. more likely to remit and return. One the other hand, introducing purchasing power di¤erences would make the model more realistic but would considerably complicate the model without qualitatively a¤ecting our results. In this case, all the migrant's income sources, including savings, would have a di¤erent impact according to the chosen location.
While this complicates the analysis, this e¤ect does not counterbalance our results on remittances, since returns to remittances are also a¤ected by the additional asymmetric e¤ect of purchasing power di¤erences.
In other words, the inclusion of di¤erent purchasing powers introduces an asymmetry across locations which a¤ects all decision variables in the same way, so that our results would be qualitatively unchanged. Stark, O., Helmenstein, C., & Yegorov, Y. (1997) . Migrants' savings, purchasing power parity, and the optimal duration of migration. International Tax and Public Finance, 4(3), 307-324. Stark, O. & Levhari, D. (1982) . On migration and risk in ldcs. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
First, recall that
Applying Leibniz's rule, and keeping in mind that the only object which depends on r is D R ,
Second, similarly,
Hence, applying Leibniz's rule again, 
o . Under these assumptions, after some computations, 20 one can show that the expected wage (9) can be rewritten as
where the density function f (D w ) depends on and 2 . The parameter h only serves as a scaling parameter, giving a relevant range for , r and s. We will pose h = 100. Summing up, the remittance technology relies on the following set of parameters: ( ; ; a; b; ). We start by showing the impact of remittances 2 0 To see this, note that under normality, we have that E (wojDw) =
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Returns to savings dominate returns to remittances in the host country (the lower shaded curve) for r larger than 20. However, it is more interesting to compare s, the green line, to E [R], the continuous black curve.
When r is low, so is D R and therefore the likelihood of return migration F (D R ). As a result, for r < 20, , is close to zero, so that E [w] is close to h = 100. As r increases, so does the probability of return migration, until F (D R ) = 1 (for about r = 100 in this example).
Comparative statics
We explained that prior beliefs about migration success had an important impact on returns to remittances.
The next …gure illustrates this point, keeping the same parameter values, except for , which equals 40, 20 and 10 in the black, red and blue curves, respectively (the green line represents returns to savings):
The same exercise is performed for the shape of returns to remittances R l (r). We compare in the next …gure the concave case presented so far to the linear case (the black curve, with (a; b) = (1; 2)) and the convex case (the red curve, with (a; b) = (1:4; 0:8)). 
The latter condition might be ful…lled even if
> 0. Indeed, the more the migrant remits, the more his/her consumption path is distorted at the expense of …rst period utility. This cost is convex, while the bene…t in terms of second period consumption is concave. The second case occurs if, due to liquidity constraints, the migrant is unable to spend enough remittances so as to raise their return to the level of the return to savings, . Then, remittances are at a corner and the migrant saves instead.
Appendix 4: Proof of Lemma 5
First, let us rewrite the total variance as
Based this expression, one can write the e¤ect of r on V ar [c 2 ] as the sum of three e¤ects.
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We …rst split the resolution of these three e¤ects in two separate subsections, and then gather them in third subsection.
The derivatives of o and h with respect to r
First, note that
Applying Leibniz's rule,
Note that, as seen in the previous appendix,
does not depend neither on w o nor on D w , and can therefore exit from the integrals of the second term. One can then rewrite
2 1 Note that since wages are the only source of uncertainty,
32 By a similar reasoning,
Summing up,
10.2 The derivative of oh with respect to r
The derivative of the third term ( oh ) with respect to remittances is given by First, let us show that the normality assumption helps obtain analytical results to our problem. Indeed, to assess the distribution of the di¤erence of two random variables, such as D w = w h w o , is generally a very 2 2 Those calculations make use of the following relationships:
V ar (w l jD R ) = E w 2 l jD R E (w l jD R ) 2 ;
E (w h jD R ) E (wojD R ) = E (w h wojD R ) = D R :
and are available upon request.
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demanding task which makes use of concepts of cross-correlation of distributions and complex conjugate of density functions. Such a distribution does not have an analytical expression in virtually all types of distribution functions, except the normal distribution. In other words, assuming a normal distribution is the unique case which provides an analytical solution to the problem of the determination of D w 's distribution.
In this case, D w , which is a linear combination of two normal random variables, is also normally distributed, 
Conditional expectation
Second, as we already saw in the previous section, we make extensive use of the concept of conditional expectation of wages. In general, the conditional expectation E [w o jD w ] is a complex, usually nonlinear, function of D w , which depends on the joint distribution of w o and D w . In the case of the joint bivariate normal distribution, however, the conditional expectation is linear in D w according to the following general formulation:
Let us develop this expression in order to provide more intuition. Since cov (D w ; w o ) = 
Conditional variance
The conditional variance under normality is based on the following general formula: 
The e¤ect of remittances on consumption variance
Combining the expressions of conditional expectation and variance with Lemma 5, the second term of (21) vanishes. The e¤ect of remittances on consumption variance boils down to @V ar(c 2 )
where, based on the conditional expectation formula, it is straightforward to show that conditional expectations with inequality are:
Therefore, E(c o jD w D R ) E(c h jD w > D R ) can be rewritten as
so that @V ar(c2) @r < 0 if and only if
h > e h (r) :
12 Appendix 6: Proof of Proposition 6
First, recall that f h (r)
If wages are jointly normally distributed, the following relationships hold: Let us …rst mention that, in such a setting, the ability to choose a location after the risk is revealed allows the agent to earn a higher income, on average, than if she was locked in one of the two locations. Indeed,
= w F (0)E(x j x < 0)
> w:
This result obviously applies to the more general framework of this paper. Second, let us discuss the impact of the initial risk composition h on the agent's aggregate risk. To this end, we calculate the variance of the agent's income: 
